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I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
HE Court of Criminal Appeals heard a habeas corpus petition
raising a double jeopardy during the Survey period. The applicant
. in Ervin v. State1 was convicted under two homicide statutes that
are closely related. 2 Under the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Blockburger v. United States,3 when a single act is a violation of two dis-
tinct statutes, the test for whether there is more than one offense is
"whether each [statute] requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."'4 When the Blockburger test was applied to the facts in Ervin, the
unavoidable conclusion was that the offenses were not the "same." This
meant that the state could convict for both offenses without violating
double jeopardy even when there is only one transaction and one victim.
If the Blockburger test is the only test that can be applied to determine
whether a crime is the "same" for double jeopardy purposes, the appel-
lant's search for relief would be disappointed. But the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that it is not. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Law School. J.D.,
University of Nebraska College of Law. Former member of Utah State Board of Pardons
and consultant for the National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice.
1. 991 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (reh'g denied Mar. 1.7, 1999).
2. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1994) (manslaughter); TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 49.08 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (intoxication manslaughter).
3. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4. Ervin, 991 S.W.2d at 806 (citing 284 U.S. at 304).
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agrees with the trial court's conclusion, it does so for different reasons. 5
The Court of Criminal Appeals began its analysis with a review of the
Supreme Court's view of multiple punishment. The Double Jeopardy
Clause prevents a sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment
than that intended by the legislature.6 "[One] suffers multiple punish-
ments in violation of Double Jeopardy when he is convicted of more
[crimes] than the legislature intended."'7 And, the Supreme Court has
held that the Blockburger rule is simply a rule of statutory construction
and a clearly articulated intent by the legislature cannot be negated by
it.8 This raised for the court the likelihood that there may exist other
rules of statutory construction to be employed to determine whether the
legislature intended multiple punishments. The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals then identified the issue before it as "[w]hether homicide offenses
that are distinct under Blockburger may nevertheless be considered the
'same' for purposes of the 'multiple punishments' aspect of the Double
Jeopardy Clause .... 9
Its survey of jurisdictions prompted the court to conclude that with re-
spect to murder prosecutions (rather than other variations of homicides),
most jurisdictions hold a trial court cannot impose multiple convictions
and sentences for variations of murder when only one person was
killed.' 0 The minority view, then, is that "different variations of murder
can support multiple convictions even though only one person was
killed."' I Although the numbers are not as one-sided, jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue hold that a trial court cannot impose multiple
convictions for variations of homicides when only one person was killed.
This review led the court to conclude that Blockburger is not the single,
exclusive test for deciding whether offenses are the same for purposes of
multiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court con-
sidered other factors that may require the court to hold the offenses are
the same for double jeopardy purposes.' 2
5. See id.
6. See id. at 807 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)).
7. Id. (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740
(1985)).
8. See id. (citing 459 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 673).
9. Id.
10. See id. (numerous citations omitted).
11. Id. at 811.
12. Other nonexclusive factors included:
whether the offenses provisions are contained within the same statutory sec-
tion, whether the offenses are phrased in the alternative, whether the of-
fenses are named similarly, whether the offenses have common punishment
ranges, whether the offenses have a common focus . . .and whether that
common focus tends to indicate a single instance of conduct, whether the
elements that differ between the offenses can be considered the 'same' under
an imputed theory of liability which would result in the offenses being con-
sidered the same under Blockburger... and whether there is legislative his-
tory containing an articulation of an intent to treat the offenses as the same




The court turned to the two statutes in question. Prior to September 1,
1994, manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter were simply two alter-
native methods of committing involuntary manslaughter. 13 Most jurisdic-
tions hold that variants of murder contained in the same statutory section
are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes when the same victim
is involved. Because the pre-1994 versions of manslaughter and intoxica-
tion manslaughter appear in the same statutory section, because they are
alternatives, and because they carry the same punishment ranges, the
court concluded that they are the same offense in the pre-1994 statute.
Continuing its examination, the court noted that effective September 1,
1994, the intoxication manslaughter provision was moved to a section
containing other intoxication offenses, but, finding no evidence of such
intent, the court determined that the legislature did not intend to change
intoxication manslaughter into an entirely different offense for double
jeopardy purposes. None of the statutory changes made effective Sep-
tember 1, 1995, applies to the appellant's offense; further, evidence of
intent to impose multiple punishments is tenuous at best.14
Thus, the court concluded that manslaughter and intoxication man-
slaughter are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes when they
involve the same victim. Double jeopardy is violated even when the
sentences run concurrently.
The court's unanimity ended when it came to the remedy. The State's
recommendation was unusual. It requested neither that the guilty plea be
set aside nor that the court try to effectuate the agreement by reforming
one of the convictions to a less-included offense. Rather, the State asked
the court to vacate the conviction for manslaughter, relying on earlier
suggestions by the court that the State may waive an illegal portion of a
judgment and maintain the remainder of the plea agreement.15 The dis-
senters argued that the appropriate remedy is to withdraw the plea and
return the parties to their respective positions.16
On balance, this opinion from the highest court on criminal matters
bodes well for defendants because it makes possible a double jeopardy
claim where the single victim is killed in the same incident even if they
are not distinct under Blockburger.
II. MENS REA
During the period of this review, the Court of Criminal Appeals con-
sidered an interesting set of cases dealing with mens rea in strict liability
offenses.
The first of these cases, Tovar v. State,17 involved the former president
of a school board who was convicted of violating the Open Meetings Act
13. See id. at 815.
14. See id. at 817.
15. See id.
16. See id. (Meyers, J., dissenting and joined by Mansfield and Johnson, JJ).
17. 978 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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(the Act). 18 Joseph Tovar was convicted of knowingly participating in a
special closed meeting of the school board and knowingly calling and aid-
ing in calling and organizing a special closed meeting of the board in vio-
lation of the Act.
The relevant statute in Tovar's case provided:
(a) A member of a governmental body commits an offense if a
closed meeting is not permitted under this chapter and the mem-
ber knowingly:
(1) calls or aids in calling or organizing the closed meeting,
whether it is a special or called closed meeting;
or
(3) participates in the closed meeting whether it is a regular,
special, or called meeting.19
The Act punishes an offense as a misdemeanor by a fine of not less than
$100 and not more than $500 and/or confinement in county jail for not
less than one and not more than six months.
The appellant asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that appellant
"must know that the closed meeting is not permitted under the Texas
Open Meetings Act." The judge denied the request and instructed the
jury instead that:
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that... Joe
Tovar ... did knowingly call or aid in calling or organizing a special
closed meeting ... which was not permitted under Chapter 551 of
the Government Code... in that none of the above exceptions apply
• ..then you will find Joe Tovar, [sic] guilty of Violation of [the]
Open Meetings Act as charged in the indictment.20
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review. The appellant
argued that it is the State's burden to prove that he knew the closed
meeting violated the law. The State's view is that there is no mens rea
with respect to whether the meeting was lawful.
The Court of Criminal Appeals observed initially that the Act is a con-
duct-oriented offense and not a circumstance- or result-oriented offense.
Next, it examined the structure of the Act. The foundation of the statute
is the independent clause, 21 "a member of a government body commits
an offense." The subordinating conjunction, "if," connects the dependent
clause, 22 "a closed meeting is not permitted under this chapter and the
member knowingly . . . ." The word "and" separates this dependent
clause into subclauses, the first of which has a subject and predicate
("meeting is . . .permitted") and the second of which has a subject
18. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.144 (Vernon 1994).
19. Id.
20. 978 S.W.2d at 585 (citations omitted).
21. An independent clause is a group of related words that can stand alone as a
sentence.




("member") and a number of disjunctive predicates "calls," "aids," and
"participates." The adverb "knowingly" in the second subclause modifies
the disjunctive predicates that follow it and, the court concludes, the two
subclauses are independent of each other. Thus, the court held the plain
language of the Act and the rules of grammar and common usage indi-
cate that an official can be held criminally liable for involvement in closed
meetings not permitted under the Act regardless of whether he knew the
meeting violated the law.2 3
Although the plain language of the statute provided the basis for the
court's holding, other policies support the result. The holding is consis-
tent with the Act's purpose of protecting the public's interest in the oper-
ation of government and with the Penal Code's prohibition of mistake of
law defenses. Punishment under the Act is not severe, and it punishes
behavior that is malum prohibitum rather than malum in se.24 Judge
Baird concurred, noting specially that it is incumbent upon public officials
to be aware of laws relevant to their areas of operation. 25
The Court of Criminal Appeals considered another strict liability stat-
ute in Zubia v. State,26 holding that the offense of injury to a child does
not require a culpable mental state regarding to the age of the victim.
The appellant, a member of a gang, had retaliated against a rival gang by
shooting into a group of people standing in the yard of a rival member's
home. He struck a four year old.
The appellant argued that the doctrine of transferred intent could not
be used to prove he intended to injure the child, when, in fact, he in-
tended to shoot the child's adult uncle. The court of appeals held that
intent to injure a child was not required by the statute.27
The dissent engaged in a more rigorous analysis of the appellant's argu-
ment than did the majority. The majority merely adopted a verbatim par-
agraph from the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the conviction.
The court of appeals based its determination that intent was not required
by the statute on a like holding from a sister court. It observed that other
criminal statutes dealing with children victims tend not to require scienter
as to age.28
The dissent by Judge Meyers argues that the plain language of the stat-
ute is unambiguous and the interpretation of the majority reads the spe-
23. See Tovar, 978 S.W.2d at 587.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 588.
26. 998 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
27. The statute provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
by omission, causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual:
(1) serious bodily injury ....
(c) In this section: (1) "Child" means a person 14 years of age or younger."
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1994).
28. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon 1994). The court noted, how-
ever, that murder can become a capital offense if the victim is under the age of six, but
there are no cases addressing intent as to the victim's age.
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cial status of the victim out of the statute. Moreover, when statutes
designate special categories of victims and require mens rea, the special
categories are not readily identifiable2 9 the way that special victims are
under § 22.04.
Within a few months the court again addressed this topic in the context
of a statute that was silent as to mens rea. In Aguirre v. State,30 the court
held that mental state is required in a statute regulating an adult business,
although that statute is silent as to mens rea. Employees and managers of
a nude live entertainment club, Aldo's Lounge, were convicted under an
El Paso city ordinance which prohibits conducting such a business within
a thousand feet of a school. 31 The Eighth Court of Appeals reversed and
ordered the complaint dismissed for failure to allege a culpable state of
mind. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed in a well-crafted, though not
uniformly adopted, opinion by Justice Womack.
The court began by observing that § 6.02 of the Penal Code 32 requires
mens rea unless its definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.
Since strict liability statutes typically say nothing about mental state,33 the
court looked to the legislative history and determined a court must find a
manifest intent to dispense with the culpable state of mind and that si-
lence as to state of mind leaves a presumption that one is required. As a
general matter, of course, the legislature is free to dispense with a mens
rea requirement, but that intent must be manifest.
Although there was no express intent to dispense with mens rea, the
court examined other features of the statute. Among factors considered
by the court were whether the statute imposes criminal rather than civil
liability, whether the offense was malum in se or malum prohibitum, the
subject of the statute, the degree of care required to comply, whether the
enactments carry severe punishments, the legislative history of the stat-
ute, the seriousness of the harm the legislature seeks to prevent, the ac-
tor's opportunity to ascertain accurate facts, the difficulty that proving
mental state would present to prosecutors, and the number of prosecu-
tions that might be expected. 34
After an extensive examination of the other features of the statute, the
court concluded that the ordinance did not "manifest an intent to dis-
29. For example, aggravated assault is a felony of the first degree when the actor knew
the victim was a public servant who was lawfully discharging an official duty. See TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2) (Vernon 1994).
30. Aguirre v. State, No. 0580-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (not designated for
publication), 1999 WL 767794.
31. El Paso City Code § 20.08.080 provides in relevant part:
"Adult Businesses
A. No person shall own, operate or conduct any business in ... [a] nude live
entertainment club within one thousand feet of the following:
2. A public or private elementary or secondary school ......
32. The Court explained that the state provision applied to municipal ordinances. See
Aguirre, 1999 WL 767794 at *4.
33. See id.
34. See id. at *8.
[Vol. 53
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pense with a culpable mental state sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion that one was required. '35 Several dissenting opinions were filed
asserting that the State Prosecuting Attorney had no standing to bring the
appeal or that review had been improvidently granted.36
Taken together, Tovar, Zubia and Aguirre demonstrate the significance
of the mens rea requirement in terms of burdens of the parties. The court
applies a developed body of factors to arrive at results based on articu-
lated public policies.
III. THE ACCOMPLICE WITNESS RULE
During the Survey period the Court of Criminal Appeals again consid-
ered the accomplice witness rule. In Cathey v. State37 the court held that
constitutionally mandated legal and factual sufficiency standards do not
apply to review of corroboration of testimony by an accomplice witness.
The victim, 20-year old Christina Castillo, disappeared on Sept. 12,
1995. Her body was found twelve days later in a desolate area of Hous-
ton. There was a blindfold on the body and duct tape bound the hands
and wrists. Three gunshot wounds in the head were the cause of death.
There were cartridge cases at the crime scene but no direct evidence to
the identity of the murderer.
In January 1996 an informant gave a detailed confession indicating that
he, the appellant, and four others had planned to rob the victim and her
boyfriend, believed to have money and drugs. To that end, the victim was
abducted by the men and taken to a place where she was interrogated
and beaten in an unsuccessful attempt to get her to divulge information
about drugs or money. The conspirators took her to a desolate area
where they decided to abandon her. As some of the members of the
group drove away in a vehicle belonging to one of the conspirators, they
heard several gunshots and appellant later that evening told one of the
men that he had killed the victim.
A conviction cannot stand on accomplice testimony alone; state statute
requires corroboration by other evidence tending to connect the defen-
dant with the crime.38 It is insufficient if the evidence proves merely that
a crime has been committed 39 but neither must it directly connect the
defendant to the crime nor be sufficient by itself to establish his guilt.40 If
the combined weight of non-accomplice evidence tends to connect the
defendant with the crime, then the statute's requirement has been met.41
Corroborative non-accomplice evidence in the appellant's case con-
sisted of testimony from a man who purchased from appellant the
35. Id. at *9.
36. See id. at *9-12.
37. 992 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en bane).
38. See id. at 462 (citing TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art 38.14).
39. See id. (citing Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 838-839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
40. See id. (citing Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
41. See id. (citing Gosch v. State, 829 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
2000]
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weapon that was used in the murder, a criminologist's testimony that the
gun could be matched with the spent casings from the crime scene, a
statement from a woman that appellant had said he was "wanted for mur-
dering some Spanish girl," and finally testimony from another non-ac-
complice that appellant told him he and some of the others were
"together when the bitch got shot."'42
Appellant argued that the evidence was too weak to meet the State's
burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
holding that the legal and factual sufficiency standards do not apply to a
review of accomplice testimony under article 38.14, the majority said the
accomplice witness rule is derived from state statute and not from state or
federal constitutional principles. Likewise, the remedy for failure to meet
the burden-acquittal-is a statutory rather than a constitutional
requirement. 43
The majority's holding evoked criticism from dissenter Judge Meyers
who argued that the court has, in the past, superimposed on the rule ele-
ments derived from federal constitutional principles on legal sufficiency
review. For example, the court has reviewed these claims "in the light
most favorable to the verdict," a concept derived from constitutional
principles articulated in Jackson v. Virginia44 and not from statute.45 Ad-
ditionally, the court has considered whether "reasonable" or "rational"
jurors could find sufficient corroboration in the evidence.46 The majority
denies that the accomplice witness rule has ever been grounded on fed-
eral constitutional principles, noting that none of the cases cited by the
dissent actually hold that the sufficiency review must employ that stan-
dard. While the tendency to do so may stem from routine application
under Jackson, it is not constitutionally mandated. The Jackson standard,
write the majority, is irrelevant to the accomplice witness corroboration
requirement itself.47
Judge Meyers also argued the remedy of acquittal rather than retrial
stems from constitutional principles enunciated in Burks v. United
States48 and Greene v. Massey49 as well as from state statute,5 0 citing Ex
parte Reynolds51 for that proposition. The majority distinguished Burks
and Greene as cases involving the double jeopardy effects of finding evi-
dence insufficient rather than the mechanics of a sufficiency review. The
majority also noted that the Fifth Circuit has treated the accomplice wit-
ness rule as a requirement of state law with no independent constitutional
42. Id.
43. See Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
44. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
45. See Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 467 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (citing Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) and Gill v.
State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
47. See Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 463.
48. 437 U.S. 1 (1977).
49. 437 U.S. 19 (1997).
50. See Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 467.
51. 588 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
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footing.52 The majority conceded, however, that Judge Meyers' position
was understandable given some "loose and confusing language" in past
decisions. The court found sufficient non-accomplice evidence that
tended to connect the defendant to the murder so that he might be con-
victed based on accomplice testimony.
In a subsequent case, Trevifio v. State,53 the Court of Criminal Appeals
illustrated the difference between evidence that shows only that the de-
fendant was present at the crime scene and evidence that he was involved
in its perpetration. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of non-accom-
plice evidence to support a conviction of capital murder committed in the
course of a rape. He argued that the non-accomplice evidence only
showed that the defendant was at the crime scene and not that he was
involved in its perpetration. Regarding the appellant's fingerprints from
the crime scene, the court agreed the evidence merely placed the appel-
lant at the scene of the crime, however, the appellant's blood on the vic-
tim's panties and the fibers from appellant's pants found on the victim's
clothes tended to connect him to the crime itself.5 4 This physical evi-
dence shows that the appellant had intimate contact with the victim and
might have suffered defensive wounds. The court found the combined
strength of the three items of evidence sufficient to support the
conviction.55
IV. POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE COURTS-
AUTHORITY TO REFORM JUDGMENT
Collier v. State56 presented the Court of Criminal Appeals with a ques-
tion regarding the power of an appellate court to reform a judgment. The
appellant was indicted by a grand jury for serious bodily injury to a
child.57 At the close of evidence at trial, the district court instructed the
jury only on serious bodily injury to a child because neither party re-
quested an instruction on a lesser included offense. The jury found appel-
lant guilty and he was sentenced to 35 years imprisonment and a $10,000
fine as a result of an enhancement for prior convictions. 58
On direct appeal, the appellant successfully challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence. The Austin Court of Appeals reversed and entered a
judgment of acquittal. Although the appellate court concluded that the
trial evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for the lesser included
offense of injury to a child, 59 it held that it did not have the authority to
reform the judgment to a conviction for the lesser included offense be-
52. See Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 463 (citing Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1062
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1035 (1987).
53. 991 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
54. See id. at 852.
55. See id.
56. 999 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
57. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon 1994).
58. 999 S.W.2d at 780.
59. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3) (Vernon 1994).
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cause the jury was not instructed on that offense. The Austin Court of
Appeals cited Thorpe v. State60 for the proposition that when evidence is
not sufficient to support conviction for a charged offense even though it
may be sufficient for a lesser included offense, the reviewing court must
enter the only other judgment authorized by the trial court's charge-
acquittal. 61 The Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review
to determine whether the appellate court erred. The state argued that the
lack of a lesser included offense instruction was irrelevant to the appel-
late court's ability to reform the judgment, because the jury necessarily
found the appellant guilty of the lesser included offense when it found
him guilty of the greater offense. The defense argued that the State
asked the court to give it the benefit of an instruction it did not request.
A plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellate
court. It began its analysis with an examination of Bigley v. State.62 In
Bigley, the defendant was convicted by a jury for possession of 400 grams
or more of methamphetamine. The appellate court found that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support that conviction, but, since an instruction
on the lesser included offense was given, the appellate court reformed the
judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser included offense. Noting
that the reasoning of the lower court was sound and the outcome correct,
the court distinguished Bigley from the instant case because there had
been given a lesser included offense instruction in Bigley.
After noting that this was a case of first impression, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals next turned to a case in which Wisconsin resolved the
same question. In State v. Myers,63 the Wisconsin defendant was charged
with aggravated battery. At trial, he moved to dismiss at the conclusion
of the State's case, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of the
great bodily harm. The motion was denied and the case went to the jury,
who were instructed on aggravated battery only. Neither the state nor
the defendant requested an instruction on the lesser included offense.
When the conviction was reversed on appeal because there was insuffi-
cient evidence of great bodily harm, the appellate court refused to direct
the trial court, per the state's request, to enter a judgment of conviction
for attempted aggravated battery, a lesser included offense.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the court of appeals. The
state supreme court said that whether to request a lesser included offense
is a matter of trial strategy for the parties because they are in the best
position to assess the question based on the risks and benefits anticipated
from an instruction on the lesser included offense. The high court said
the trial court
need not instruct on a lesser included offense unless one of the par-
ties requests the instruction and the evidence under a reasonable
60. 831 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no pet.).
61. See Collier, 999 S.W.2d at 780 n.2.
62. 865 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
63. 158 Wis.2d 356, 461 N.W.2d 777 (1990).
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view ... is sufficient to establish guilt of the lower degree and also
leave a reasonable doubt as to some particular element included in
the higher degree but not the lower .... 64
The Wisconsin court concluded that the state was asking to be rescued
"from a trial strategy that went awry."'65 When the state decided not to
request instructions on a lesser included offense, it did so with the hope
that the jury would convict the defendant of the greater offense rather
than let him go scot-free because it believes he is guilty of some offense
even though it may have some doubt about the evidence. The inclination
of the jury to punish one who has done something bad may overpower its
misgivings about the state's proving guilt of the greater offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The defendant, on the other hand, adopts a strategy
based on a different hope when he declines to request an instruction for a
lesser included offense. He hopes that the jury will acquit on the greater
offense because the evidence is arguably insufficient. He relies on the
jury's adherence to the instruction that the state has the burden of prov-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Both parties, the Wisconsin court
observed, "went for broke."'66
By granting the state's request, the Wisconsin court would provide the
state with all the benefits and none of the risks of its jury instruction
strategy while giving the defendant none of the protections and all of the
risks. This would create an incentive for the state, even when its evidence
is weak, to request only the instruction on the greater offense and then, if
the judgment is reversed because of insufficient evidence, the state could
obtain a conviction on the lesser included offense from the appellate
court.
67
Adopting the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Court of
Criminal Appeals held:
[A] court of appeals may reform a judgment of conviction to reflect
conviction of a lesser included offense only if (1) the court finds that
the evidence is insufficient to support conviction of the charged of-
fense but sufficient to support conviction of the lesser included of-
fense and (2) either the jury was instructed on the lesser included
offense (at the request of a party or by the trial court sua sponte) or
one of the parties asked for but was denied such an instruction.68
A concurring opinion by Judge Keasler was prompted by the view that
Texas precedent allowed the same result. Rule 43.2 of the Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure allow a court of appeals to "reverse the trial court's
judgment in whole or in part and render the judgment that the trial court
should have rendered. ' 69 Based on the language of the rule Judge
64. Collier, 999 S.W.2d at 781 (citing State v. Myers, 158 Wis.2d 356k 364 401 N.W.2d
777, 780-81 (1990)).
65. Id. at 782 (citing State v. Myers, 158 Wis.2d 356, 367, 461 N.W.2d 777, 782 (1990)).
66. Id. (citing State v. Myers, 158 Wis.2d 356, 367, 461 N.W.2d 777, 782 (1990)).
67. See id.
68. Id.




Keasler concluded that the "judgment that the trial court should have
rendered" can only be a judgment that the trial court was capable of ren-
dering, given the instruction to the jury. If a jury is only instructed on one
offense, then the trial court can only render judgment on that offense or a
judgment of acquittal. Conversely, if a jury is not instructed on a lesser-
included offense, a trial court is not able to render judgment on that
lesser-included offense. "A court of appeals cannot reform a judgment to
reflect a conviction for a lesser-included offense unless that lesser-in-
cluded offense was submitted in the jury charge. '70
A dissent, written by Judge Keller and joined by Presiding Judge Mc-
Cormick and Judges Holland and Womack, argued that the plurality en-
tirely misconstrued the nature of the remedy for insufficient evidence and
imposed a procedural default requirement unsupported by caselaw. This,
the dissent argued, creates a potential dilemma for the State.
The dissent's analysis began with the observation that the Due Process
Clause protects citizens from conviction based on insufficient evidence.71
It cited United States v. Morrison72 for the proposition that remedies
should be tailored to the injury caused by the constitutional violation
without unnecessarily infringing on competing interests. The competing
interest here is deference to the verdict of the factfinder. Reformation to
the lesser included offense would accord the greatest respect possible to
the factfinder's determination while fully protecting the defendant's due
process right not to be convicted of an offense that is insufficiently sup-
ported by the evidence.73
The plurality's holding, the dissent continued, amounts to a claim that
the State had procedurally defaulted rather than a claim that the appel-
late court lacked the authority to reform74 but procedural default con-
cepts are generally divorced from evidence sufficiency.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument marshaled by the dissent is
Malik v. State,75 which requires appellate courts to review evidence ac-
cording to the hypothetically correct charge rather than the charge that
was actually given. Straightforward application of the Malik rule, the dis-
sent argued, dictates that the legal sufficiency of the evidence must be
measured by the lesser included offense requirements rather than those
of the charged offense.
Regarding the plurality's assertion that the State would derive an un-
fair strategic advantage were it to hold otherwise, the dissent retorted
that legal sufficiency claims are "not subject to gamesmanship," and it
disputed the contention that the state would receive a windfall benefit at
all. 76 Finally, Judge Keller argued that under the plurality's rule, prosecu-
70. Collier, 999 S.W.2d at 784 (Keasler, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 785 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
72. 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
73. See Collier, 999 S.W.2d at 786.
74. See id. at 787.
75. 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
76. Collier, 999 S.W.2d at 788.
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tors may sometimes be in a position where either requesting or not re-
questing the lesser included offense instruction might result in reversible
error.
On September 29, 1999, the State's motion for a rehearing was denied.
Presiding Judge McCormick dissented from the denial because the origi-
nal case was decided by a fragmented court so there is no "majority"
holding, the case was decided contrary to the "overwhelming weight of
authority from other jurisdictions," the plurality's opinion is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of federal constitutional double jeopardy
principles, and ignores the fact that it is more onerous for the prosecutor
to get a lesser included offense than the plurality suggests. 77
V. APPEAL
During the Annual Survey period, the Court of Criminal Appeals
heard several cases dealing with various aspects of appellate review, in-
cluding the sufficiency of evidence after deferred adjudication and the
factual and legal sufficiency of evidence. Manuel v. State78 involved an
appellant who, pursuant to a plea bargain, pled guilty to indecency with a
child. Also, according to the terms of the agreement, the court deferred
adjudication without entering a finding of guilt and ordered the appellant
do community supervision, i.e., probation. The trial court noted on its
docket sheet that it was not giving permission to appeal. The appellant
was subsequently adjudicated guilty of violating the terms of his proba-
tion, at which time the trial judge found him guilty of the original charge
and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment. The defendant ap-
pealed arguing that the evidence adduced at the original plea proceeding
was insufficient to prove his guilt. The intermediate court of appeals
never reached the merits of appellant's argument because it held that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals
granted discretionary review and agreed with the appellate court.
The court began its analysis by recalling that the predecessor to the
statute in question had been construed in McDougal v. State79 which held
that the clear import of the statute was to preclude review of deferred
adjudication. The case explained that if the defendant was not satisfied
with the deferred adjudication order, the proper remedy is to move for
final adjudication as provided by the statute.80 It was also true at that
time that "a defendant whose deferred adjudication probation was re-
voked could appeal from that revocation and raise a claim of error arising
from the original plea proceedings."' 8' In 1987, the deferred adjudication
law was changed to conform with the legislative intent "to permit defend-
ants to appeal from deferred adjudication community supervision to the
77. Id. at 791-794.
78. 994 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
79. 610 S.W.2d 509, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
80. See TEX. CoDE P. App., art. 42.12, § 5a (Vernon 2000).
81. Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661.
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same extent . . . as defendants are permitted to appeal from 'regular'
community supervision. '82 The court held that deferred adjudication
community supervisees may raise appeals regarding conviction only when
deferred adjudication is originally imposed. Thus, such issues may not be
raised in an appeal filed after community supervision was revoked.
The next group of cases brought occasion for the Court of Criminal
Appeals to assert the notions that factual sufficiency of the future danger-
ousness issue, factual sufficiency of mitigation and legal sufficiency of mit-
igation are not reviewable. In Brooks v. State83 the appellant was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death based on the jury's
responses to the special issues. The appellant argued that the evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to support the finding of guilt, as
well as the jury's findings of future dangerousness and mitigation. Utiliz-
ing the standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia,84 the court found
there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of guilt
and future dangerousness. It also found factually sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding of guilt, but it refused to consider (1) the factual
sufficiency of the jury's finding of future dangerousness, (2) the legal suffi-
ciency of the jury's finding on mitigation and (3) the factual sufficiency of
the jury's finding on mitigation.85 With respect to the first issue, the court
declared, "We do not review the factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury's answer to this special issue," and cited McGinn v.
State.86 The refusal to review the sufficiency, factual or legal, of the evi-
dence of mitigation was based on a citation to Griffith v. State87 and
others without further discussion.88
Several months later, in another capital case, the Court of Criminal
Appeals again asserted these principles but included more discussion
than it had otherwise during the Survey period. In Chamberlain v.
State,89 the appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death.
He had once been the neighbor of the victim and her small son. When
the child had been taken away for a visit by an adult, the appellant went
to the victim's apartment to borrow sugar. He bound her with duct tape
and sexually assaulted her. After he killed her, he returned to his apart-
ment and soon thereafter walked his dog. The semi-nude victim was dis-
covered by her brother and her son when they returned.90 The appellant
was not identified as the murderer until six years later, 1997. In the
meantime, he spoke of the crime with others.
82. Id.
83. 990 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
84. 443 U.S. 307 319 (1979).
85. See Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 285.
86. 961 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
87. 983 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
88. See Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 284.
89. 998 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
90. See id. at 230.
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The appellant challenged the factual sufficiency of the evidence offered
to establish that he presented a continuing threat to society.91 Citing
Clewis v. State,92 the court said it had "repeatedly declined to apply [that]
review."' 93 The Court would not have said more had the appellant not
argued that direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals deprived him
of due process in violation of article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitu-
tion. The appellant argued that he was being treated disparately because
his case would not be reviewed by a court of intermediate appeals as are
non-capital cases. Were his case to be reviewed by the court of interme-
diate appeals, the appellant argued, the intermediate appellate court
would be "compelled to review the factual sufficiency to the evidence
supporting the special issues." 94
The Court of Criminal Appeals called the argument flawed. It is the
"nature of the special issues," i.e., that they are mixed questions of law
and fact, and it is not a lack of jurisdiction that prevents the Court from
performing a factual sufficiency review of those issues.95 The court con-
tinued: "Such questions evade factual sufficiency reviews because the re-
viewer has no accurate means of weighing the jury's moral response to
the evidence. Thus, even if appeal were to the intermediate appellate
courts, the special issues would elude factual sufficiency review."
96
VI. THE DEGARMO DOCTRINE
In Leday v. State,97 the Court of Criminal Appeals reconsidered and
overruled the DeGarmo doctrine98 in the case of an appellant who was
convicted of aggravated possession of a controlled substance. The defen-
dant unsuccessfully attempted to suppress evidence of cocaine and re-
lated testimony on the ground that the search that produced them was
illegal. 99 The Beaumont Court of Appeals dismissed appellant's appeal,
and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review. 00
Appellant and another were on a "drug run" when they were stopped
for speeding. The State and the appellant had different versions of how
the cocaine was discovered, but in the end, appellant was found to have
28 grams of cocaine hidden on his person. The cocaine evidence was in-
troduced at trial, and the jury was instructed to disregard evidence pro-
duced by the search of appellant if they had reasonable doubt that the
vehicle was properly stopped or that there was probable cause to search
appellant. The jury found the defendant guilty. At the punishment phase
91. See id. at 233.
92. 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996).
93. Chamerlain, 998 S.W.2d at 233.
94. Id. at 234.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. 983 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
98. See DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 973 (1985).
99. See Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 714.
100. See id. at 715.
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of the trial, the defendant took the stand and testified that he agreed to
do the run to pay off a student loan. He was sentenced to twenty years
confinement and assessed a fine of $20,000.101
On review by the Court of Appeals, it was held that "any error occur-
ring at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial is deemed to be waived if the
defendant admits his guilt to the charged offense during the punishment
phase of the trial.' 02 It cited McWhorter v. State103 as extending the rule
to any errors committed during the punishment phase as well.10 4
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals began by noting the confusion
caused by its own decisions as well as academicians in terminology used
in this area. The term "waiver" has been employed to denote both the
doctrines that defeat review of a ruling on a timely, specific objection as
well as failure to make such an objection. It is properly applied only to
the former, and the Court noted that it is more accurately a doctrine of
harmless error.105
Also troubling to the court was the misuse of "curative admissibil-
ity.' 06 Under the common law of evidence, "curative admissibility" re-
fers to the doctrine that allows admission of evidence that might
otherwise be excludable to counter an earlier error in receiving evidence.
It is a doctrine of admissibility, not harmless error. Unfortunately, the
Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied the term in cases where the defen-
dant's evidence, presented in response to improperly admitted evidence,
results in harmless error because similar evidence was later admitted
without objection. The court traced the erroneous usage to a misread
footnote and wrote that it disapproves of application of the term "cura-
tive admissibility" to these cases. 10 7
Texas adheres to the "futility rule," that is, even though a judge has
ruled that evidence is admissible, the party must keep making futile ob-
jections or waive it.10 8 Thus, the court will overrule an objection to evi-
dence when that evidence is previously admitted without objection,10 9
and when a court has overruled a previous objection, it is usually not
reversible error when the same evidence is later admitted without objec-
tion.' 10 Texas' requirement that an objection be made every time the ob-
jectionable evidence is offered is a minority rule."' The Court
summarized the rule by saying that "overruling an objection to evidence
will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without
objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling" regardless of
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. 911 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, no pet.).
104. See Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 715.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 716.
107. See id. at 716-717.
108. Id. at 718.
109. See id. at 717.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 717-18.
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whether the State or the defendant offer the other evidence. 12 Acknowl-
edging that it is doubtful that the defendant intended to waive an objec-
tion in all cases in which he objected to some but not all of the state's
evidence, 113 the Court noted that when a defendant offers the other evi-
dence it has made exceptions to the rule.
Two exceptions were found applicable to the appellant's case. First, the
defendant's testimony, constituting the other evidence, was impelled by
the introduction of State's evidence that was obtained in violation of the
law. To make the exception inapplicable, the prosecutor must show that
the State's illegal evidence did not impel the defendant's testimony, ad-
dressing a number of factors enumerated by the court. 114
The second relevant exception is that the dilatory effect of improperly
admitted evidence is not remedied by the defendant's attempt to rebut
the evidence.1 15 In analyzing this exception, the court pointed out the
"cruel trilemma" that the Court of Appeals created for a defendant, and
that doing so was counter to the policies articulated by the enactment of
article 38.23 that illegally obtained evidence should not be admitted in
criminal trials and that the jury decides not only guilt, but questions of
fact about the legality of the evidence presented by the State.116 Further,
it rejected the notion that these exceptions should be subject to a rule
requiring waiver of an error in the admission of evidence by the mere fact
of rising to rebut the evidence. 117
The Court of Criminal Appeals turned next to the DeGarmo doctrine
since the Court of Appeals had held the doctrine means the appellant
waived his point of error by his testimony at the punishment phase of a
trial in which he admitted guilt.
Although DeGarmo was not decided until 1985, its history began in
1966 with the enactment of a rule allowing for bifurcated trials.118 The
separation of criminal trials into guilt and punishment phases creates the
scenario in which the DeGarmo doctrine operates because the defen-
dant's testimony is given after a finding of guilt.119 Appeals from bifur-
cated trials gave rise to two lines of cases. One held that the defendant,
who admitted his guilt at the punishment phase, could not appeal the
sufficiency of evidence, but appeals were allowed for other errors occur-
ring in the guilt phase. The second held that when a defendant admitted
guilt at the punishment phase, he could not complain about the lawful-
ness of searches for and seizures of evidence. While these lines of prece-
dent barred consideration of errors made during the guilt stage, none
112. Id. at 718.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 718-19 (citing Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982)).
115. See id. at 719.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 720.
119. The Court noted that this is a conceptual difference between the DeGarmo doc-
trine and harmless error (mistakenly referred to as "waiver").
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barred consideration of mistakes made during the punishment phase. 120
The court described as "breathtaking" the statement made in 1985 in
DeGarmo v. State that testimony by the defendant at the punishment
stage in which he admits guilt bars review of "any error that might have
occurred during the guilt stage of the trial."'121
It rejected the DeGarmo court's notion that admitting guilt at the pun-
ishment phase is the equivalent of a guilty plea for two reasons. First,
there are procedures to ensure that a plea is voluntary and knowing. No
such procedures are followed prior to the defendant's decision to testify
in the punishment phase. Second, and more importantly, the decision to
testify under these circumstances is not voluntary. Rather, it is driven by
the verdict of guilty that was infected with reversible error. Without the
tainted conviction, the defendant would not be faced with the decision of
whether to testify. The court concluded that the analogy to a guilty plea
did not justify the doctrine. 122
In McGlothlin v. State,123 another attempt at a "reasoned justification
for the DeGarmo doctrine was made." This court rejected the McGloth-
lin court's notion that the doctrine serves the trial's function of sifting the
truth from contradictory evidence. It began by noting that truth is not
the only objective of the trial. During its course, other important values
like due process and individual rights sometimes override the search for
truth. The court concluded that the DeGarmo doctrine could not be justi-
fied on the ground that the verdict of guilty was factually correct and
ultimately held that the doctrine cannot be invoked to prevent review of
the appellant's issues. 124 Thus, the court held that the appellant had not
waived her Fourth Amendment objection to evidence by taking the stand
during the guilt phase to testify that the drugs in his possession were ille-
gally seized. It held further that the appellant's testimony during the pun-
ishment phase did not result in waiver of the Fourth Amendment claim
during the guilt phase.' 25
Although the court in Leyday held as it did in spite of the futility rule,
it made a critical reappearance in Fuentes v. State.126 The evidence in
Fuentes established that appellant and three others conspired to rob
Handi Mart, a convenience store. The store was busy when the appellant
and his cohorts arrived. Among the store's customers was Robert Tate, a
regular customer and acquaintance of the owners. The robbery was in
progress when Tate pursued one of the robbers and detained him. Appel-
lant came running out of the store and, seeing his cohort's situation, he
shot Tate twice in the chest. The victim' fell into a ditch and died.
120. See id. at 722.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 723.
123. 896 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. 991 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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The appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
Appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic. One of the ar-
guments appellant raised on appeal is that the trial court erred when it
gave its own definition of beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court provided the jury with the definition of reasonable
doubt required by Geesa v. State,127 but in addition, it volunteered fur-
ther explanation. The appellant objected that the court had articulated a
lesser standard than that required by law. The court overruled the objec-
tion and essentially repeated the instruction again. No objection was
made to the later comments. In affirming the appellate court, the Court
of Criminal Appeals wrote, "In order to preserve error, the objecting
party must continue to object each time the objectionable evidence is
offered.' 128
Leday and Fuentes appear to show the court's faithfulness to the futility
rule, even though the court in Leday acknowledged that it was a minority
rule and ultimately relied on other grounds for its holding.
VII. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
In the Survey period, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered
whether the appellant was entitled to lesser included offense instructions
for aggravated assault where he was charged with murder, but ultimately
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. In Forest v. State129 the appellant
and his wife were at a party also attended by the victim and his girlfriend.
When the appellant's wife and the victim's girlfriend got into a fight, their
partners began quarreling about how to stop the women from fighting.
When the apartment manager made them go outside, the fight between
the men continued while appellant's wife left and returned with a gun.
The appellant put the gun in his pocket and began to escort his wife from
the party at which time the victim ran up behind him and struck appellant
over the head. The victim then turned and ran. According to witnesses,
the appellant chased him and shot him in the back. The appellant testi-
fied that he felt threatened by the victim's earlier statement that he in-
tended to make the appellant "leave Dallas tonight," particularly because
he knew the victim owned a gun. He asserted further that he tried to
shoot the victim "in the butt" but did not intend to kill him. He acknowl-
edged that there was a risk that a person would die if someone shot
him. 130
The jury convicted the appellant of voluntary manslaughter and he was
sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. The trial court entered
a finding that the appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the
commission of this offense. The appellant appealed and the Dallas Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded because it concluded that the trial
127. 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
128. 991 S.W.2d at 273.
129. 989 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
130. Id. at 366-67.
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court should have granted appellant's request for a jury instruction on the
lesser included offense of aggravated assault.' 3' The Court of Criminal
Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review.
The state argued that the trial court correctly denied the appellant's
requested instruction. A defendant must be granted an instruction of a
lesser included offense if he meets two requirements. First, the proof for
the offense charges must include proof necessary to establish the lesser-
included offense. Second, there must be some evidence in the record that
would permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty, he is
guilty only of the lesser included offense. 132 Anything more than a scin-
tilla of evidence will entitle defendant to an instruction on a lesser-in-
cluded offense. 33 In the abstract, aggravated assault can be a lesser-
included offense of murder. A person commits aggravated assault when
he commits assault 34 and causes serious bodily injury to another or uses
or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.135
Murder is committed when a person "(1) intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of an individual; (2) intends to cause serious bodily in-
jury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of an individual."'' 36
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court reasoned that appel-
lant's own testimony was that he intended to shoot the victim "in the
butt," i.e., he intended to cause serious bodily harm. There is no question
that the appellant's conduct resulted in the victim's death and that firing a
gun in the direction of someone is clearly dangerous to human life. The
evidence, therefore, showed at least that he was guilty of murder under
§ 19.02(b)(2). There was not, however, any evidence that the appellant
was guilty only of some offense less than murder. Thus, the trial court
had not erred when it refused appellant's instruction on the lesser-in-
cluded offense. 137
VIII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In Prystash v. State 38 the Court of Criminal Appeals considered a
plethora of challenges to the capital murder conviction of the appellant.
The appellant had agreed to murder a man's wife for remuneration and
employed another to do the shooting. Appellant provided the shooter
with a gun and drove him to the victim's home where the killing took
place. The appellant was convicted of capital murder and direct appeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic.
131. See id. at 366.
132. Id. at 367.
133. See Bignal, 887 S.W.2d at 23.
134. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 1994).
135. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (West 1994).
136. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(b) (West 1994).
137. See Forest, 989 S.W.2d at 368.
138. 3 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc)
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The most important argument raised by the appellant was based on the
jury instructions in the penalty phase. Article 37.071, section 2(b)(2) re-
quires the trial court to submit to the jury a number of special issues, one
of which is termed the "anti-parties" issue, the question of "whether the
defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually
cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or an-
other or anticipated that a human life would be taken."139 The appellant
requested and the trial court agreed that this issue could be omitted. Ap-
pellant now complains that the trial court erred in failing to submit that
issue.
In his argument, appellant relies on Powell v. State140 which held that
reversible error had occurred when the trial court agreed to defendant's
request to substitute an issue for cases tried on the law of parties for the
deliberateness issue called for by the statute at the time. 14 1 Noting that
Powell's analysis was done in terms of preservation of error, the majority
wrote that Powell was wrongly decided insofar as it allowed the defen-
dant to raise as error an action that he sought. Rejecting the Powell
court's analysis based on whether one could waive statutory require-
ments, the court held that rule of invited error estopped the appellant in
this case from asserting his claim.
In the dissenting opinion, in which Judges Meyers and Price joined,
Judge Holland argued that because there was no jury finding on the anti-
parties special issue, the trial court was without authority to impose death
at all.' 42 The dissenters asserted that the effective dates of a statute are
"absolute requirements which are independent of the litigant's
wishes. '143 By doing this, the majority effectively eliminated an element
the jury was statutorily required to find before a death sentence could be
imposed. The vital role played by the anti-parties special issue-prevent-
ing a defendant, found guilty as party, from being sentences to death for
the conduct of another rather than upon the defendant's own conduct-is
undercut by the majority opinion.1 44 The court rejected the points of er-
ror and affirmed his conviction. 145
IX. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed a trial court's refusal to order
payment of a polygraph examiner for an examination and testimony to be
given on appellant's behalf. In Jackson v. State 46 the appellant was
charged with capital murder for killing Mario Stubblefield. It was alleged
139. Id. at 529. The issue was added to the statute by the Act of June 16, 1991, 72d
Leg., R.S., ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2898, 2899.
140. 897 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
141. 3 S.W.3d at 530.
142. Id. at 542.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 546.
145. Id. at 537.
146. 992 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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that appellant killed the victim because the victim had given testimony
before the grand jury implicating appellant's friend, Smith, in a prior of-
fense. A witness saw Smith, appellant and the victim talking together in
and around a car that was parked in front of the victim's home moments
before the shooting. When Smith was confronted by the police, he gave a
statement indicating that he had no prior knowledge that appellant in-
tended to shoot Stubblefield. Upon learning of his friend's statement
from the police, appellant said that Smith had paid him $200 to do it and
executed a statement to that effect.
At trial, the appellant changed his story. In his testimony he denied
any talk of payment by Smith and said he merely wished to frighten the
victim out of testifying against Smith. Appellant was convicted by a jury
and sentenced to death. Appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals was
automatic. 147
Among appellant's points of error was the contention that the trial
court erred in refusing to pay for an expert witness, a polygraph exam-
iner, to conduct an examination and testify in his behalf. Appellant
wished to show that the statement he gave regarding being hired to com-
mit the murder was false. He asserted that he was misled into making the
false statement by the police officer who questioned him. The officer de-
nies misleading the appellant. In support of his petition requesting funds
for the polygraph examiner the appellant attached a letter from the ex-
pert saying that he could administer an examination and render an opin-
ion regarding whether the appellant had given false information in his
statement to the police.
In support of the argument that he was entitled to access to a state-paid
expert witness the appellant cited Ake v. Oklahoma,148 where the Su-
preme Court found that an indigent who relied on an insanity defense in
a capital case was entitled to the assistance of a state-provided psychiatric
expert. In doing so, it considered the defendant's interest, the State's in-
terest and the "probable value of the ... procedural safeguards that are
sought, and the risk of the erroneous deprivation of the affected interest
if those safeguards are not provided."' 49 The Court held that
when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psy-
chiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 50
The Court of Criminal Appeals cited a number of cases in which ex-
perts were provided, noting that it had followed the same reasoning as
that applied in Ake. In each of the cases cited the court notes that the
defendant had made a preliminary showing that there was a significant
147. 992 S.W.2d at 472.
148. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
149. Id. at 77.
150. Id. at 83.
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issue of fact on which the State would offer expert testimony and which
the lay jury's knowledge would not be expected to encompass. Turning to
the appellant's request for a state-funded expert, the court distinguished
his situation from those cases where state funding was provided. First,
the appellant had not made an initial showing of a significant factual issue
on which the State would provide expert evidence. Neither had the ap-
pellant shown the existence of a significant factual issue which the lay
jury's knowledge would not likely encompass.
The issue in appellant's case was the credibility of two witnesses-the
appellant and a police officer. This, the court says, is precisely the kind of
question resolved by juries. Additionally, the United States Supreme
Court has recently held that exclusion of polygraph evidence did not un-
constitutionally abridge a defendant's right to present a defense noting
that there is no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable. 151 The
court held that appellant was not entitled to a state-funded polygraph
examiner.
X. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL
In Hernandez v. State,152 the Court of Criminal Appeals granted dis-
cretionary review to reconsider the standard to be applied in ineffective
counsel claims in noncapital cases. The appellant had been convicted of
aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The court held that both prongs of the Strickland test-deficiency and
prejudice-are applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims at
non-capital sentencing proceedings. 153
Chronologically, the caselaw that led the Hernandez court to overrule
Ex parte Duffy154 and Ex parte Cruz155 developed in the following way.
In 1980, the highest criminal appeals court in the Texas system held, "as a
matter of federal and state constitutional law, that the 'reasonably effec-
tive assistance of counsel' standard was the sole test in all cases alleging a
deficiency in attorney performance.' 56 Four years later, the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington 57 rejected the stan-
dard as the only one to be applied to claims of deficient attorney per-
formance in a state capital case. 158 The Court instead established the
two-pronged test: (1) whether counsel's conduct was deficient, and (2)
whether, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. 159
151. See Jackson, 992 S.W.2d at 474 (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303. 317
(1998).
152. 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
153. Id. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
154. 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
155.. 739 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
156. 988 S.W.2d at 771.
157. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
158. 988 S.W.2d at 771.
159. Id. at 770, n.3.
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Having adopted the two-part test of performance and prejudice by
which effectiveness of counsel is measured, the Strickland Court, never-
theless, left unanswered the question of whether a different approach was
necessary to define effective assistance of counsel as a constitutional mat-
ter in noncapital cases. That question was taken up by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Cruz. There the court held, "as a matter of
federal constitutional law, that the Duffy standard applies only to non-
capital sentencing proceedings."' 160
The Strickland standard had a requirement not contained in the Duffy
standard, i.e., proof that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel's deficient performance. Thus, Strickland re-
quires a showing of prejudice while Duffy does not.161 The Hernandez
court said the Cruz court's erroneous conclusion that the defendant in a
noncapital sentencing proceeding does not have to show prejudice from
deficient attorney performance was based on a misreading of Strick-
land.162 For that reason and others, the Hernandez court decided that as
a matter of federal constitution law Duffy and Cruz must be overruled.
The majority in Hernandez was criticized for ignoring stare decisis. It
replied to dissenting opinions' objections by pointing out that
"[p]rinciples of stare decisis have no application in this context since we
have no choice but to follow United States Supreme Court precedent on
matters of federal constitutional law.' 163
Finally, the Hernandez court considered whether the Duffy standard
should be considered as a matter of state law. It decided against doing so
because Duffy was only "a three-judge plurality with no precedential
value. ' 164 It further eliminates the likelihood of independent state
grounds supporting the Duffy standard with the observation that the
Court of Criminal Appeals has never squarely decided the scope of the
right to counsel under state constitutional provisions but it has consist-
ently held the state right "is no more protective than its federal counter-
part."'1 65 It observed further that
[a]pparently the intent of Texas' right to counsel constitutional provi-
sion does not affirmatively guarantee lawyers to those who cannot
afford them and it does not affirmatively guarantee the effective as-
sistance of lawyers to those who can afford them. Texas' right to
counsel constitutional provision, like the original intent of its federal
counterpart, apparently is only intended to prohibit the government
from interfering with the right to a criminal defendant "to employ a
lawyer to assist in his defense."'1 66
160. Id. at 771.
161. 988 S.W.2d at 770, n.3.
162. See id. at 771.
163. Id. at 772.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 773 (citations omitted).
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In his dissent, Judge Mansfield expressed the belief that overruling
Duffy does violence to stare decisis because the reasons for doing so are
not sufficiently compelling. Dissenting Judges Price, Meyers and Johnson
complained that neither of the grounds given for granting discretionary
review is the actually the focus of the majority's opinion. They view as
"purely gratuitous dicta" the majority's "novel proposition" that the state
constitution provides less protection than does the U.S. Constitution. 167
The majority asserted that inconsistency between Duffy and Strickland
requires that Duffy be overruled because we must follow United States
Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal constitution law. 168 This
is correct, according to the dissent, which added that it is well established
that a state may provide greater protection to its citizens than does the
federal constitution. It seems evident that Duffy could be harmonized
with Strickland based on independent state grounds. Nevertheless, the
majority dismissed Duffy as a three-judge plurality without precedential
worth. It is the majority's refusal to acknowledge its inconsistency that
caused the dissent to write:
[T]he section of the majority opinion on state constitutional law [ci-
tations omitted], which is actually there to criticize contemporary Su-
preme Court jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
a right to counsel, reads less like a judicial decision than a political
polemic. However, since the job of courts is to decide concrete con-
troversies of law, such statements have no place in a court
opinion. 169
Finally, the dissenters derided the majority's inability to acknowledge
that the court should adhere to its opinions for some minimal amount of
time.170
XI. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
The appellant in Mozon v. State171 was convicted of aggravated assault
and sentenced to five years' imprisonment and community supervision.
Her conviction was based on an incident at her high school in which the
appellant, in response to what she characterized as threats from the vic-
tim, poured gasoline on him and set him afire. The appellant was preg-
nant at the time and among the threats she reported was the threat to
"beat the baby" out of her. The appellant testified that she was afraid of
the victim but that she told no one in authority because she did not be-
lieve they would protect her. She considered using a gun or knife but
chose instead to set his shirt on fire because she "didn't want to hurt
him.",72
167. Henandez, 988 S.W.2d at 775.
168. Id. at 771.
169. Id. at 775.
170. Id. at 776 (Price, J., dissenting, joined by Meyers and Johson, JJ.)
171. 991 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
172. 991 S.W.2d at 843.
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The appellant tried unsuccessfully to enter testimony about prior vio-
lent incidents of which she was aware at the time of the incident. She
wanted to show that she reasonably believed she was in danger when the
victim pushed his tray away. The trial court determined that the evidence
was relevant to her claim of self-defense but found it was inadmissible
under Rule 403. The Tenth Court of Appeals agreed and the Court of
Criminal Appeals granted discretionary certiorari to determine "whether
evidence which supports a relevant defensive theory is subject to Rule
403, and, if so, whether the trial court's balancing test determination is to
be reviewed by the standard set out in Montgomery v. State."'173 The
appellant argued that Rule 403's balancing test does not apply to this
evidence of prior violence because it supports her theory of self-defense,
and so, if there is prejudice to the state it is not unfair.
The court began by examining the appellant's view that a balancing
determination is not needed because Rule 403's concept of prejudice is
incorporated by the common law and Rule 404(a)(2). The common law
includes the Dempsey cases which held the defense could admit evidence
of the decedent's character for violence if there was some aggressive act
by the decedent that raised an issue as to whether the defendant's con-
duct was justified as self-defense. 174 Those cases were superseded by
Rule 404(a) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence which provides that
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts are inadmissible to prove char-
acter conformity but a defendant may offer evidence of a victim's charac-
ter to show the victim was the initial aggressor and to show the victim's
state of mind.175 Further, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals agreed that the trial court's ruling must be measured against
the relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision is made per factors
appearing in Montgomery and its progeny. Factors include (1) how com-
pellingly the evidence makes a fact more or less probable, (2) the poten-
tial the evidence will impress the jury in some irrational, indelible way,
(3) the time needed to develop the evidence, distracting the jury from
consideration of the indicted offense, and (4) the force of the defendant's
need for this evidence to establish this fact. 176
The Court of Criminal Appeals also found the trial court erred when it
failed to engage in a discussion of the unfair prejudice to the state that
would be caused by the admission of appellant's evidence. Such a discus-
sion is necessary because Rule 403 presumes admissibility of all relevant
evidence and the judge is authorized to exclude it only when there's a
"clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence
and its probative value."' 77 The dissenters complained that the prejudice
173. Id. at 844. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), op.
on reh'g.
174. 991 S.W.2d at 845.
175. See id.




to the state was obvious and that remand was unnecessary. 178
Smith v. State179 considered how and to what extent a trial court must
balance permission under Article 38.36(a) to offer extraneous offense ev-
idence involving the relation between a murderer and his victim against
the judge's obligation to not admit evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by its prejudicial value and to ensure against admission of evi-
dence for the sole purpose of showing the defendant acted in conformity
with his past bad character toward the victim, and thus, that he murdered
her.
In Smith the appellant had a violent relationship with his girlfriend, the
victim. She disappeared without explanation and her body was never
found. Appellant was indicted for her murder and at trial he tried to
keep the jury from hearing evidence regarding his former physical abuse
of the victim and others and an incident in which he killed the victim's
dog. The trial court admitted the evidence over the appellant's 404(b)
and 403 objections. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the evidence
was admissible under Article 38.36(a) so the trial court did not have to
observe rules 404(b) and 403. Relying on Criminal Rule of Evidence
101(c), the court of appeals said that Article 38.36(a) excuses the state
from having to satisfy rules 404(b) and 403. The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that
evidence admissible under Article 38.36(a) may be nevertheless ex-
cluded under Rule 404(b) or 403. Consequently, if a defendant
makes timely 404(b) or 403 objections, before a trial court can prop-
erly admit the evidence under Article 38.36(a), it must first find the
non-character conformity purpose for which it is proffered is rele-
vant to a material issue. If relevant to a material issue, the trial court
must then determine whether the evidence should nevertheless be
excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the factors in Rule 403.180
The opinion of the majority was met with a dissent by Judge Keller who
was joined by Presiding Judge McCormick and Judge Keasler, concurring
in the majority's decision to remand to the Court of Appeals for an analy-
sis under Rule 403 but dissenting from its decision to remand for analysis
under Rule 404(b).
178. Id. at 848.
179. 5 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
180. Id. at 679.
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